We consider the processes through which a firm can acquire resources and argue that its current stock of resources create asymmetries in competition for new resources. Two simple models illustrate how this can work through linkages on the demand and/or cost side. The normative implication is that firms should expand their resource portfolios by building on their existing resources. Different firms will then acquire different new resources and small initial heterogeneities will amplify over time.
I. INTRODUCTION
The processes through which firms acquire resources have become a somewhat vexing aspect of the resource based view (RBV) . From the very early days of the RBV, scholars have understood that in most reasonable models, if several identical firms compete for a resource, ex ante expected returns will be zero.
i Since the idea is that resources support super-normal returns, something has to give. Many scholars have worked on the problem and the debate is still ongoing (Ahuja and Katila, 2004) .
We here propose a very simple resolution: That a firm's cost of acquiring a new resource and /or the value it can create with this resource, depends on the resources already possessed. This leads to an asymmetry in the "resource market" and allows super-normal profits to be had.
ii
We can illustrate both arguments in the context of a winner-take-all patent race.
Suppose that the patent goes to the firm expending most "effective effort", which we will think of as a function of a firm's existing resources and the amount of money it invests. A firm which can produce more effective effort per dollar than its competitors should be more likely to win the patent and do so at a price below its value. Similarly, a firm which can extract more value from the patent will be willing to pay more and should be more likely to win and do so at a price below its reservation value.
The formal model can be seen as a very simple an example of chaos and nonlinear dynamics; a case in which small differences in initial conditions cause otherwise identical systems to evolve to very different end states. The closest analog is Selove (2009) who looks at a model in which two firms can invest in either of two resources -enabling them to serve either of two market segments. Assuming that the value of resources exhibit increasing returns to scale, he shows that a small initial lag in one segment will cause a firm to focus on the other.
The literature contains many alternative classes of explanations, including appeals to random shocks (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Barney, 1986; Ahuja and Katila, 2004 ), bounded rationality, or claims that some firms simply are better at the acquisition process per se (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997) . We do not address the relative importances of these factors and those introduced here.
We look at cost linkages in Section II, starting with the formal argument and going on to offer several examples. We do the same for value linkages in Section III iii and conclude with a discussion in Section IV.
II. CURRENT RESOURCES REDUCING THE COST OF NEW ONES

II.1 Theory
To isolate the forces driving our argument, we will make several simplifying assumptions. These should not be interpreted as boundaries of the qualitative insights, but as ways to focus on the forces that are first order. We will discuss each assumption in turn.
1. Most pairs of resources are unrelated in the sense that having one will have no effect on the costs of acquiring the other. Furthermore, some resources increase the costs of getting specific others. For example, a firm with a large customer base will find it hard to cultivate an exclusive image. These cases are, however, not important. 
II.2 Examples
The learning-by-doing examples in Wernerfelt (1984) are of this type. Suppose that it takes two resources, say customer trust and low manufacturing cost, to compete in the market for a new product. If manufacturing cost position is the new resource, more trusted firms can sell more and will thus be able to develop manufacturing skills by moving down the learning curve. If customer trust is the new resource, the idea is that firms with lower cost can develop trust cheaper. In either case, firms can use an existing advantage to earn another.
A big class of examples is that in which the new resource shares some attributes with the existing resource. Consider a fast food chain which has a good reputation as place to have lunch. Such a firm may be able to accelerate the production of a dinner reputation by taking advantage of many of the attributes that built its lunch reputation.
The development of the new resource will often affect the existing resource. The examples described in the above paragraphs suggest that the feedback effect is positive, but this is not always the case. Suppose, for example, that a firm wants to develop a large user-base for a product. This can typically be facilitated by applying a "high end" brand name, although the brand might loose it cache in the process.
III. CURRENT RESOURCES ENHANCING THE VALUE OF NEW ONES
III.1 Theory
A conceptually different, but formally similar, case is that in which the target resource is worth more to firms with more of the existing resource. So we will concentrate on ordered pairs of resources for which the first (existing) resource increases the value of the second (target) resource. If we describe this relationship by the increasing function v(r i ), the analog of (2) is
Using the same analysis as in Section II, we find that firms with larger r i have larger expected profits, and make larger investments, giving them better chances of winning the
III.2 Examples
This class consists of all cases in which the two resources are complements and thus includes the "manufacturing cost and consumer trust" example mentioned in Section II.2. The lower your cost, the more you gain from trust and vise versa. Another interesting case is that of two-sided networks. For example, a broker with more sellers will put a higher value on more buyers and will thus be willing to invest more in customer acquisition.
Since it takes several resources to make and sell many of the complex products offered in today's markets, complementarity between resources is very widespread.
vii While this tends to favor already resource rich firms, it also exposes them to more risk.
For example, the value of all complementary resources is reduced if a brand name is destroyed by an unfortunate incident.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have identified conditions under which firms' existing resources influence their investments in new resources. The analysis contributes to the RBV by proposing an alternative mechanism by which firms add to their stock of resources. The mechanism is close to the spirit of mainstream economics. It does not appeal to luck, bounded rationality, higher order resources, or the like, but simply thinks of the resource acquisition process as an asymmetric investment game.
An important question is whether the forces identified are descriptively important. As a first pass one could look at case histories of individual firms and interpret the development of their resources in light of the argument. To perform a more systematic test, one would have to look at a class of relatively homogeneous situations, such as retailers in different towns or the like. However, given the embryonic state of empirical work on the RBV, this is likely to be very difficult.
We are on firmer ground on the parallel question about normative applicability. The model makes clear and simple suggestions about the direction of investment whenever there are cost-and/or revenue linkages between resources. The advice in the resource market is to build on your strengths -just as the RBV tells you to do in the product market.
